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COMMENT
Su7ToN V. UNITED AIR LINES, INC.: THE SUPREME COURT
APPLIES "CORRECTIVE" AND "MITIGATING" COMMON
SENSE TO THE ADA
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that it has been your lifelong dream to one-day work as a
global airline pilot. You get your pilot's license. You log thousands of
hours of flight time. You obtain the requisite licenses and medical cer-
tificates to fly passenger flights, and you get experience as a commercial
airline pilot. But when your big day comes to interview for a global air-
line pilot position, the interviewer informs you that your uncorrected
vision does not meet airline standards, and although you can see 20/20
with your glasses, your impairment prevents you from fulfilling your
dream. "That is nonsense!" you think to yourself, and in the pursuit of
happiness, and in the grand spirit of American resolve, you do what any
red-blooded, good-hearted American would do when dreams are
dashed-you consult an attorney. And the comforting words of the attor-
ney assure you that, although life may have dealt you a bad hand in hav-
ing to wear glasses, Congress has re-dealt the cards in your favor by cre-
ating what is known as the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
("ADA" or "Act").' In other words, you can file a lawsuit claiming that
you are disabled because of your poor eyesight, and that the airline dis-
criminated against you based on that disability
If a hint of sarcasm is detected, it is intended. After all, before the
early 1990's, who among us thought of a person who wore glasses as
being disabled? Although the above-described person is a sympathetic
character and has a legitimate grievance regarding the airline's question-
able policy, it seems disingenuous for such a person to claim to be dis-
abled when she can simply slide on a pair of glasses and eliminate the
effects of her impaired vision. When the ADA was under consideration,
Congress heard testimony from people who were considerably limited in
their ability to perform basic, essential activities and who experienced
extensive discrimination because of those limitations.' Those people
1. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
2. This is the essence of an employment discrimination claim under Title I of the ADA, i.e.
the existence of a disability and discrimination based on such disability. See discussion infra notes
27-31 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 154 and accompanying text.
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were not able to easily and significantly mitigate the effects of their im-
pairments, as a person who simply needs glasses can.
Nevertheless, many courts have considered whether the ADA cov-
ers correctable or treatable impairments such as poor eyesight, high
blood pressure, depression, asthma, and poor hearing, when treatment
considerably or completely diminishes their limiting effects.! Corrective
and/or mitigating measures are available to control such impairments for
many, if not most people afflicted by them.' It is often possible to miti-
gate the effects of such impairments to a level where the afflicted indi-
vidual functions equivalently to a person without the impairment. For
example, a person with poor eyesight can achieve 20/20 vision by wear-
ing prescription eyeglasses. Nonetheless, courts have generally con-
cluded that the ADA requires them to consider whether an individual is
disabled without reference to such mitigating measures.' Stated another
way, these courts have ignored the actual effect of the treated impairment
on the individual; instead, they have focused on how the impairment
would normally affect an" untreated person. This was the issue presented
in a suit brought by twin sisters Karen Sutton and Kimberly Hinton (Pe-
titioners). Their case, Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,' involved facts
similar' to the scenario described above, and is the focus of this Com-
ment.9
Approximately forty-three million Americans suffer from some
form of physical or mental disability." The author of the 1988 version of
4. See, e.g., infra notes 66, 68.
5. For example, it is common knowledge that the use of prescription eyeglasses or contact
lenses corrects vision completely when worn, just as the use of a hearing aid may dramatically
improve the effects of hearing loss. These remedies are readily available to most Americans.
Similarly, various prescribed medications are capable of controlling high blood pressure, asthma or
depression.
6. See, e.g., infra note 68 and accompanying text.
7. 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
8. The author admittedly took some creative liberties with the facts of the case in the opening
paragraph of this Comment. For a complete account, see infra text accompanying notes 79-90.
9. In addition to Sutton, the Court addressed the issue in two other cases decided the same
day. See Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999); Albertsons, Inc. v.
Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999). All three cases involved the issue of whether corrective and/or
mitigating measures should be considered in determining whether an individual is disabled under the
ADA. Sutton expresses the court's reasoning, and the Albertsons and Murphy opinions cite to that
reasoning as resolving the respective cases. Further discussion of the Albertsons and Murphy
opinions is beyond the scope of this Comment.
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(l) (1994). The Supreme Court in Sutton traced the likely origin
of this number to a report by the National Council on Disability. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147
(citing Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a
Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 434 n. 117 (1991)):
The 43 million figure was not presented by its source as a number of persons with
disabilities, but rather as a figure representing the number of persons with impairments or
chronic conditions. The author has elsewhere discussed the dubious derivation of this
figure, along with his reasons for concluding that it is nonetheless a useful, rough
estimate.
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the ADA stated, "[b]y almost any definition, Americans with disabilities
are uniquely underprivileged and disadvantaged. They are much poorer,
much less well educated and have much less social life, have fewer
amenities and have a lower level of self-satisfaction than other Ameri-
cans."" For centuries, people afflicted with varying forms of disability
faced discrimination in almost every conceivable aspect of public life.'2
Since 1990, the ADA has provided disabled people with a weapon to
combat discrimination.'3 The ADA, however, has also proven fruitful for
people with conditions not commonly regarded as disabilities or with
conditions easily and effectively treated to a degree where the practical
limitations caused by the condition become less restrictive or even non-
existent. Claimants and courts have stretched the statutory definition of
disability to absurd lengths compelling employers to expend resources
litigating frivolous claims and/or retaining unproductive employees.'4 At
the end of its 1999 term, the Supreme Court decided Sutton, narrowing
the definition of "disability," and thus limiting the number of people to
which it applies. Sutton held that when a court decides whether a claim-
ant is disabled under the ADA, that court must consider the extent to
which any measures, employed by the claimant to mitigate or correct an
impairment, diminish the effects of the impairment."
Part One of this Comment presents the background necessary for an
effective examination of Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. Part Two sum-
marizes the majority, the concurring, and dissenting opinions in the case.
Part Three analyzes critical parts of the case and argues that the congres-
sional intent behind the ADA's definition of disability is not clearly de-
fined, and therefore, the Supreme Court properly disregarded agency
guidance that required courts to make disability determinations without
11. Burgdorf, supra note 10, at 415 (citing Senate Subcommittee on the Handicapped, S. HRG.
100-166, pt. 2, at 9 (1987) (statement of Humphrey Taylor, Louis Harris and Associates) quoted in
H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt.2, at 31 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 313).
12. Disabled people have endured centuries of antipathy, segregation, and cruelty. See
FREDRICK WATSON, CIVILIZATION AND THE CRIPPLE 1-2 (1930) (discussing the history of disabled
people in society). Examples date back to ancient Greece where, under the law, "defective" children
were put to death under the assumption that they could never contribute to society. Id. This
assumption endured for centuries and still exists in some societies. Id. The influence of the Old
Testament marked deformity and mental and physical handicap as the "curse of God" and a sure
indication of "spiritual degradation" and evil. See id. at 2. Most enduring, however, has been the
prevalent practice of segregating disabled people from the rest of society. See id. at 4-5. Whether
this was accomplished legally through the mandated admittance to institutions such as almshouses,
or by the simple public wont of treating disabled people with disdain and cruelty so as to discourage
them from venturing forth from their own seclusion, depended on the prevailing notions and
presumptions of the age. See id. at 2. No matter the age, however, the message was clear: if you were
considered disabled, you were unfit for society and, moreover, you were a burden on society. See id.
at 4-5. See also 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a)(2), (7). See generally Symposium, Historical Overview: From
Charity to Rights, 50 TEMP L.Q. 953 (1977) (discussing the development of rights for people with
disabilities).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 25-33.
14. See e.g., infra notes 177-183 and accompanying text.
15. See, Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
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reference to mitigating measures. Furthermore, this part suggests that an
adequate remedy exists for those with such impairments not rising to the
level of disability, but who have nevertheless experienced discrimination
in the employment context. Part Four concludes that the Supreme Court
provided a rational and reasoned interpretation of the ADA's definition
of disability resulting in a narrowed protected class that more closely
identifies the intended beneficiaries of the Act.
I. BACKGROUND
I. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
Over the course of the last three decades, society's perception of the
physically and mentally disabled has changed rapidly. Rapid, at least
when compared to the thousands of years through which disabled people
were automatically assumed unable to contribute in a meaningful way to
society, and worse, to be a drain on society's resources.'6 In 1990, Con-
gress passed the ADA.'7 Congress enacted this comprehensive legislation
in response to a shift in the public consciousness." The ADA recognizes
that disabled people have been the target of discrimination; discrimina-
tion perhaps more subtle than for other minority groups,'9 yet nonetheless
carrying the same insidious and devastating results that accompany the
deprivation of basic human rights recognized in American society. '
Having its genesis in the civil rights movement,2' the ADA builds
upon and reflects many of the concepts and language of anti-
discrimination legislation enacted during the preceding three decades."
16. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
18. See Lisa Eichhom, Major Litigation Activities Regarding Major Life Activities: The
Failure of the "Disability" Definition in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 77 N.C. L.
REV. 1405, 1418-19 (1999) ("The recognition of paternalism, stereotyping, and failure to
accommodate as forms of discrimination prompted a call for civil rights for people with disabilities.
Activists realized the need to shift the disability paradigm from a quest for cures to a crusade for
rights."); Burgdorf, supra note 10, at 427-28.
19. The proposition that discrimination against disabled people has been more subtle than
against other minority groups is based on society's history of exiling disabled people to institutions
or group homes. This "out of sight, out of mind" approach keeps the situation out of the public eye.
See supra note 12. The sometimes violent and clamorous history (and consequent media coverage)
of the civil rights movement, in contrast, is more disposed to public consciousness and
comprehension.
20. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a); supra note 12.
21. See Jonathon C. Drimmer, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolution
of Federal Legislation and Social Policy for People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1376
(1993) (suggesting that the 1960's civil rights legislation encouraged disabled people to form more
aggressive activist organizations that emphasized the attainment of rights instead of cures). See also
supra note 18 and accompanying text.
22. See Drimmer, supra note 21, at 1397. The concepts embodied in the ADA derive from the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination based on race, color, sex, religion, and
national origin in employment, public accommodations and the provision of state and local
government services. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-
[Vol. 77:1
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The ADA, however, extends beyond animus-based discrimination to
prohibit discrimination based on cost considerations, as for instance,
when an employer refuses to hire a disabled person because it will cost
more to accommodate that person's disability." Professor Erica Worth
Harris describes this effect of the ADA as "a form of supplemental dis-
ability insurance" by allowing disabled people to remain in the
workforce rather than forcing them to collect disability benefits. '
The ADA imposes reform in the following four areas where disabled
people endure pervasive discrimination: employment, public services and
transportation, public accommodations and services operated by private
entities, and telecommunications.' The principal purpose of these various
provisions is to provide disabled people access to the same opportunities
and services that are generally available to the non-disabled population.
26
The employment provisions of the ADA seek to deter discrimination
against disabled people by giving those who are qualified for the position
they seek or hold a legal cause of action against employers who dis-
criminate on the basis of a disability in their employment-related deci-
sions, or who fail to reasonably accommodate disability-related needs.
In general, Title I prohibits employers with fifteen or more employees
from discriminating against qualified job applicants and employees who
are or become disabled.28 The Act, however, is not a mandate for af-
firmative action.9 In fact, to qualify for the ADA's protections, a dis-
2000e-17 (1994)). The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was the first federal legislative attempt to provide
substantive rights to disabled people by prohibiting recipients of federal financial assistance from
discriminating against people based on their disabilities. See Eichhom, supra note 18, at 1419;
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat..394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §
794 (1994)). The ADA extends these protections into the private sector. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213
(1994).
23. See Erica Worth Harris, Controlled Impairments under the Americans with Disabilities
Act: A Search for the Meaning of "Disability," 73 WASH. L. REV. 575, 595-96 (1998).
24. Id. at 596.
25. This Comment focuses on the definition of "disability" in the context of employment
discrimination, although the same definition is uniformly applied to the other areas covered by the
ADA. See I HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT HANDBOOK 36-37 (3rd
ed. 1997). Congress separated these areas in the Act by title. id. at 1. Title I relates to employment.
42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117. Title II covers public services and transportation. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-
12165. Title III applies to public accommodations. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189. Title IV contains
technologically oriented provisions related to telecommunications. 47 U.S.C. §§ 225, 711. Title V
covers miscellaneous provisions of the Act such as enforcement, exemptions, liability for attorneys'
fees in ADA litigation and governmental immunity. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-12213. Further discussion
of Titles 1-V is beyond the scope of this Comment.
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8)-(9); id. § 12 101(b).
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112; 1 PERRITT, supra note 25, at 2; Thomas H. Christopher & Charles
M. Rice, The Americans with Disabilities Act: An Overview of the Employment Provisions, 33 S.
TEX. L. REV. 759, 762-63 (1992).
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112.
29. See Christopher & Rice, supra note 27, at 763 ("The general principle underlying the
employment provisions of the Act is that, as long as an individual with a disability is able to perform
the essential functions of a job, with or without reasonable accommodation of his impairments, he
should not be barred from employment opportunities because of his disability.") (emphasis added)
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abled person must be capable of performing the essential functions of a
particular job with or without the employer's accommodation of any
such disability." An employer must provide reasonable accommodations
for qualified disabled employees, unless those accommodations would
impose an undue hardship on the employer.' The protected class under
the employment provisions of the ADA, therefore, includes any "quali-
fied individual with a disability."32 Before a court determines whether an
individual is qualified, it must determine if such an individual is dis-
abled.33
II. The Statutory Meaning of "Disability"
To establish a claim of employment discrimination under the ADA,
plaintiffs must first demonstrate that they are disabled within the mean-
ing of the Act.34 The Act does not necessarily require, however, that a
plaintiff actually be disabled or even be presently impaired. This is be-
cause it is possible for an employer to regard an individual as disabled
based on a past or perceived impairment that does not actually disable
the individual in a substantial way. The ADA recognizes that many im-
pairments do not rise to the level of "disability" on their own." Often the
stereotypes, myths, and fears associated with various impairments are
(citing H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 31 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 453-54); R.
George Wright, Persons with Disabilities and the Meaning of Constitutional Equal Protection, 60
OHIO ST. L.J. 145, 152 (1999).
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (defining a "qualified individual with a disability" as "an
individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires ....
[Clonsideration shall be given to the employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are essential
.... .).
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). The ADA provides a definition of reasonable
accomodation as follows:
The term 'reasonable accommodation' may include-
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by
individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant
position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or
modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified
readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with
disabilities.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
"The term 'undue hardship' means an action requiring significant difficulty or expense . 42
U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A). This section of the Act further provides factors to consider when
determining the existence of an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). See supra note 30.
33. See Timothy Stewart Bland, The Determination of Disability Under the ADA: Should
Mitigating Factors Such as Medications be Considered?, 35 IDAHO L. REV. 265, 268 (1999);
Maureen R. Walsh, Note, What Constitutes a "Disability" Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act: Should Courts Consider Mitigating Measures?, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 917, 925 (1998).
34. See Bland, supra note 33, at 268; Walsh, supra note 33, at 925.
35. See infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
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more disabling than the actual impairment.6 With that in mind, the ADA
defines "disability," with respect to an individual, as "(A) a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment;" or (C)
being regarded as having such an impairment."3 The definition of "dis-
ability" focuses on the effect of an actual or perceived impairment, and
not the impairment itself.39 Thus, a particular impairment (or set of im-
pairments) rises to the level of disabling only if its effect is substantially
limiting.
The first prong of the definition identifies the presence of a disability
stemming from an actual impairment. The second and third prongs rec-
ognize the discriminatory effect that negative stereotypes can have on an
individual resulting from a history of, ' or another's misperception of,' a
disability." The second and third prongs require a heavier evidentiary
burden on a plaintiff because it is typically more difficult to prove what
an employer perceived or thought, than it is to prove the actual state of
an individual's impairment.
36. "Such an impairment might not diminish a person's physical or mental capabilities, but
could nevertheless substantially limit that person's ability to work as a result of the negative
reactions of others to the impairment." 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(1) (1999) (quoting Nassau
County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 283 (1987)); see also Wright, supra note 29, at 146 (stating that "the
severity of a disability is thus partly a matter of impairment of functioning and crucially of public
response").
37. Because subsection (B) was not at issue in Sutton, it is not extensively discussed in this
Comment. However, one result of the Court's holding in Sutton (limiting the application of
subsection (A)) may be an increased reliance by plaintiff's on subsection (B) as a way of
establishing a disability for purposes of an ADA cause of action. The purpose and application of
subsection (B) is described in the following:
The intent of this provision, in part, is to ensure that people are not discriminated
against because of a history of disability .... This provision also ensures that individuals
are not discriminated against because they have been misclassified as disabled ....
This part of the definition is satisfied if a record relied on by an employer indicates
that the individual has or has had a substantially limiting impairment. The impairment
indicated in the record must be an impairment that would substantially limit one or more
of the individual's major life activities. There are many types of records that could
potentially contain this information, including but not limited to, education, medical, or
employment records.
29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(k).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C) (1994). This is the same definition as used in the ADA's
predecessor, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 394 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994)). See also Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405
(1979). This case, decided under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, determined that "[a] person who has
a record of, or is regarded as having, an impairment may at present have no actual incapacity at all."
Id.
39. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(j).
40. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(k). An example would include a former cancer
patient fired because of a fear of recurrence. Id.
41. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(1).
42. "Congress acknowledged that society's accumulated myths and fears about disability and
diseases are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment." Id.
(quoting Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987) (referring to the third prong of the
disability definition)).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
While an actual impairment may or may not presently exist under the
second and third prongs of the "disability" definition, the individual must
still be substantially limited in a major life activity.43 This might occur
under the third prong, for example, if an individual with a disfiguring
facial scar is unable to obtain a job because, although fully qualified for
the position, the employer is concerned about its customer's negative
reactions." In this case, if the employer thus regards the individual as
disabled and decides not to hire the individual based on the perceived
disability," the denial of opportunity resulting from the employer's fear
of customer's reactions is the disabling factor.'
What constitutes a physical or mental impairment under the Act is
defined broadly.47 The pivotal inquiry under each prong of the "disabil-
ity" definition is whether a major life activity is substantially limited by
the impairment (first prong of the definition) or the perception of im-
pairment (second and third prongs). Major life activities include such
functions as "caring for one self, performing manual tasks, walking,
seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 8 Note that
courts and agencies commonly regard "working," however, as a claim of
last resort. 9 Proving that one is substantially limited in the major life
activity of working is typically more difficult than proving the same for
other major life activities. This is because "[a]n individual is substan-
tially limited in working if the individual is significantly restricted in the
ability to perform a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various
classes, when compared with the ability of the average person with com-
43. See Burgdorf, supra note 10, at 450.
44. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(1).
45. See id. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the federal agency
responsible for implementing and enforcing Title I of the ADA, uses this example to illustrate an
instance where an individual's impairment is only substantially limiting because of the attitudes of
others. Id. This section of the EEOC Interpretive Guidance describes two instances where an
individual might be regarded as having a disability: (1) an individual's impairment, which is not
substantially limiting, is believed to be substantially limiting by the employer, or (2) an individual
has no impairment whatsoever, but is regarded by an employer has having a substantially limiting
impairment. Id.
46. See supra notes 36 and 42 and accompanying text; Burgdorf, supra note 10, at 449.
47. The EEOC defines "physical or mental impairment" as:
(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss
affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal,
special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive,
digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or
(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain
syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h).
48. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). "This list is not exhaustive. For example, other major life activities
include, but are not limited to, sitting, standing, lifting, reaching." 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. §
1630.2(i).
49. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.20) ("If an individual is substantially limited in any other
major life activity, no determination should be made as to whether the individual is substantially
limited in working.").
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parable qualifications to perform those same jobs."5 Therefore, a plain-
tiff making a claim under the major life activity of working must show
that he or she was substantially limited or regarded as substantially lim-
ited in more than the particular job he or she held or desired."
The extent to which the major life activity is limited determines
whether such an individual is "substantially limited" in that activity.52
Under the second and third prongs of the definition, limitations result
from the employer's perceptions. Under the first prong, limitations are
direct results of the impairment. In determining the extent of a limitation
under the first prong of the definition, courts are instructed to consider
such factors as the nature and severity of the impairment; the duration of
the impairment; and the expected long-term impact of or resulting from
the impairment. 3
Whether courts should consider the effects of corrective or mitigating
measures on the individual's impairment is the source of considerable
disagreement. 4 Obviously, the use of such measures diminishes the ex-
tent to which a particular impairment limits an individual. The question
therefore becomes whether the claimant possesses a disability under the
ADA if mitigating measures largely alleviate the claimant's
impairment." When a court, in its disability determination, ignores an
individual's use of mitigating measures, it increases the likelihood that it
will find that a particular impairment substantially limits a major life
activity. Therefore, it is less likely that a plaintiff will have to rely on the
more difficult to prove second or third prongs of the definition. Likewise,
the odds increase that a plaintiffs claim will survive summary
judgment. 6
III The EEOC's Position on the Question of Mitigating Measures
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is the
federal agency charged with the responsibility of implementing and en-
forcing Title I of the ADA. 7 In accordance with its directive, the EEOC
issued regulations exactly one year after the enactment of the ADA. The
EEOC supplemented these regulations with the concomitant publication
of interpretive guidance to assist covered entities' understanding of the
employment provisions. 9 Agency issued regulations are generally bind-
50. Id. (emphasis added).
51. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i).
52. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)-(ii); I PERRITr, supra note 25, at 41.
53. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(i)-(iii).
54. See infra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
55. See Walsh, supra note 33, at 93i.
56. See Walsh, supra note 33, at 932; Harris, supra note 23, at 584-94.
57. See 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1994) ("Not later than 1 year after July 26, 1990, the Commission
shall issue regulations in an accessible format to carry out this subchapter .....
58. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 (1999).
59. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app.
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ing on courts if the regulations are congressionally mandated and repre-
sent a permissible statutory construction.0 Interpretive guidance, on the
other hand, is not binding, but afforded great deference due primarily to
the specialized nature of agency authority.6'
The EEOC regulations are silent on the issue of mitigating meas-
ures. The interpretive guidance, however, specifically provides that
"[t]he existence of an impairment is to be determined without regard to
mitigating measures such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic de-
vices." This directive makes it possible for certain claimants who would
only qualify as disabled under the third prong of the definition (because
their impairment does not, by itself, limit a major life activity) to claim
protection under the first prong of the definition as well. 3 For instance,
an individual with medicinally controlled high blood pressure might suf-
fer from discrimination, even though his doctor gives him clearance to
work, because his employer regards his condition as dangerous in rela-
tion to the position he holds. This circumstance would qualify him as
disabled under the "regarded as" prong of the definition under any inter-
pretation of the Act. Courts that follow the EEOC's guidance ignore the
mitigating effects of the medicine and consider how the limiting effects
of high blood pressure would hypothetically affect or limit the individual.
This results in a court finding that such individual is also disabled under
the first prong of the Act's definition because of a substantial limitation,
albeit hypothetical, on a major life activity.
Courts that do not follow the EEOC guidance consider the effects of
the medicine on the impairment, and if sufficiently controlled, likely find
that the impairment does not substantially limit a major life activity of
the individual. This prevents the impairment from qualifying under the
first prong of the definition. This is significant because qualifying under
the first prong reduces the evidentiary burden upon the claimant when
compared to that of the third prong.' The first prong demands only a
showing that the impairment substantially limits a major life activity. A
showing of disability under the third prong requires evidence that the
employer knew of the impairment, or believed one existed, and thought
that such impairment substantially limited a major life activity. 5
60. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-
43 (1984).
61. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944).
62. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(j); see also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630(2)(i).
63. See Walsh, supra note 33, at 927.
64. See Harris, supra note 23, at 583.
65. See id. (citing Hamm v. Runyon, 51 F.3d 721, 724-25 (7th Cir. 1995)).
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IV. Discord Among the Circuits and Lower Courts in Interpreting the
Meaning of "Disability"
Before the Sutton decision, a divisive antinomy developed among the
circuits on the question of whether courts should consider the effects of
ameliorative measures in making the disability determination. The Sixth
and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals, and consequently the district courts
within their respective jurisdictions (as well as district courts within the
Fifth and Eighth Circuits), concluded that, when determining the extent
of limitation caused by an impairment, the ADA requires examination of
the effects of any ameliorative measures utilized by the individual.'
These courts typically relied on the plain language of the ADA and con-
cluded that the EEOC interpretation is inconsistent with other sections of
the interpretive guidance and with proper construction of the Act. 7
The First, Second, Third, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of
Appeals, and the district courts within their respective jurisdictions,
chose to follow the EEOC interpretive guidance and concluded that a
disability must be determined without reference to the effects of miti-
gating measures.68 Courts relying on the EEOC's position generally cited
66. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 899 (10th Cir. 1997) (corrected vision
impairment), aff'd, 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999); Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 767-68 (6th
Cir. 1997) (medicated diabetes); Wilking v. County of Ramsey, 983 F. Supp. 848, 854 (D. Minn.
1997) (medicated depression), affd on alternate grounds, 153 F.3d 869 (8th Cir. 1998); Hodgens v.
General Dynamics Corp., 963 F. Supp. 102, 108 (D.R.I. 1997) (medicated hypertension and
arrhythmia); Cline v. Fort Howard Corp., 963 F. Supp. 1075, 1081 n.6 (E.D. Okla. 1997) (corrected
nearsightedness); Gaddy v. Four B Corp., 953 F. Supp. 331, 337 (D. Kan. 1997) (asthma); Moore v.
City of Overland Park, 950 F. Supp. 1081, 1088 (D. Kan. 1996) (medicated diabetes); Murphy v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872, 881 (D. Kan. 1996) (medicated hypertension), affd, 141
F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 1998), aff d, 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999); Schluter v. Industrial Coils, Inc., 928 F.
Supp. 1437, 1444-45 (W.D. Wisc. 1996) (medicated diabetes); Coghlan v. H.J. Heinz Co., 851 F.
Supp. 808, 813 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (medicated diabetes).
67. See Walsh, supra note 33, at 942.
68. See Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law Examiners, 156 F.3d 321, 329 (2d Cir. 1998)
(self-accommodated learning disability); Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 629-31 (7th
Cir. 1998) (medicated diabetes); Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 859-66 (1st Cir.
1998) (medicated diabetes); Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 937 (3d
Cir. 1997) (medicated epilepsy); Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516, 521-22 (11 th Cir.
1996) (medicated Graves' disease); Roth v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 57 F.3d 1446, 1454 (7th Cir.
1995) (corrected vision); Sherback v. Wright Automotive Group, 987 F. Supp. 433, 437-38 (W.D.
Pa. 1997) (medicated and treated posttraumatic stress disorder); Fallacaro v. Richardson, 965 F.
Supp. 87, 93 (D.D.C. 1997) (uncorrected vision); Shiflett v. GE Fanuc Automation Corp., 960 F.
Supp. 1022, 1028-29 (W.D. Va. 1997) (treated hearing impairment); Hendler v. Intelecom USA,
Inc., 963 F. Supp. 200, 204-07 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (medicated asthma); Wilson v. Pennsylvania State
Police Dept., 964 F. Supp. 898, 905-07 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (corrected vision); Sicard v. City of Sioux
City, 950 F. Supp. 1420, 1435-39 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (uncorrected vision); Canon v. Clark, 883 F.
Supp. 718, 721 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (medicated diabetes); Finley v. Cowles Bus. Media, No.
93CIV5051(PKL), 1994 WL 273336, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 1994) (treated chronic heart
disease); Lift v. Secretary of Transp., No. 93-0118TFH/DAR, 1994 WL 579912, at *3-4 (D.D.C.
Sept. 22, 1994) (medicated depression).
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portions of the ADA's legislative history in order to support this inter-
pretation.69
A cursory review of the relevant portions of the Act's legislative
history educes apparent support for the EEOC's interpretation. For in-
stance, a commonly cited House Committee on Education and Labor
Report (Report) discussing the first prong of the disability definition ex-
plicitly states that "[w]hether a person has a disability should be assessed
without regard to the availability of mitigating measures, such as reason-
able accommodations or auxiliary aids."' A more thorough analysis of
this report, however, uncovers internal inconsistencies that ultimately
detract from the legislative history's usefulness on the issue of mitigating
measures.
For example, the reference to the "availability" of mitigating meas-
ures suggests that courts should ignore the fact that such measures may
be available, and disregard whether or not an individual chooses to util-
ize them.' In other words, the court should not question a person's deci-
sion not to utilize available mitigating measures. However, when an in-
dividual does decide to employ available mitigating measures, courts
should consider such use. This interpretation is consistent with the
EEOC's mandate that courts consider an individual's limitation on a
case-by-case basis.7 Additionally, the Report suggests that the inquiry is
to focus on the factual and present effect of the impairment on the indi-
vidual's life. This is made clear by the report's provision that "[a] person
is considered an individual with a disability for purposes of the first
prong ... when the individual's important life activities are restricted as
to the conditions, manner, or duration under which they can be per-
formed in comparison to most people."" Lastly, this Report describes a
purpose of the "regarded as" prong of the definition as ensuring "that
persons with medical conditions that are under control, and that there-
fore do not currently limit major life activities, are not discriminated
against on the basis of their medical conditions."'7 Taken as a whole, one
can interpret the Report as prohibiting a court's generalized, hypothetical
69. See infra note 70 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Arnold, 136 F.3d at 859; Matczak, 136
F.3d at 937; Harris, 102 F.3d at 521; Wilson, 964 F. Supp. at 905-06; Sicard, 950 F. Supp. at 1437.
70. H.R. Rep. No. 101 -485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334. See
also S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989) (identical quote); H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28-29
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 451 ("The impairment should be assessed without
considering whether mitigating measures... would result in a less-than-substantial limitation.").
71. See Jonathan Bridges, Note, Mitigating Measures Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act: Interpretation and Deference in the Judicial Process, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061, 1078
(1999).
72. See id. (citing 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.20) (1997)).
73. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334
(emphasis added).
74. H.R. Rep. No. 10 1-485, pt. 2, at 53 (emphasis added).
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analysis of whether a plaintiff would be disabled if not for the use of
mitigating measures.
Courts have noted similar internal inconsistencies in the EEOC's in-
terpretive guidance.75 For instance, in describing the "regarded as" prong,
the EEOC uses an example of an individual with "controlled high blood
pressure that is not substantially limiting" but who was nevertheless reas-
signed to a less strenuous position by his or her employer.76 The EEOC
guidance indicates that such an individual would not actually be disabled
under the first prong, but would be "regarded as" disabled under the third
prong." How is a court to determine that an individual's high blood pres-
sure is "controlled" if it is to ignore mitigating measures?
II. SUTTON V. UNITED AIR LINES, INC.
7
1
L Facts and Procedural History
In 1992, Petitioners applied and interviewed for passenger pilot po-
sitions with United Air Lines, Inc. ("United"). 9 Petitioners met or ex-
ceeded the requirements qualifying them for the position.7 United termi-
nated their interviews, however, because their uncorrected vision was
below that required by United of a minimum of 20/100 or better in each
eye." In response, Petitioners filed suit, alleging that United violated the
ADA by discriminating against them in the hiring process because of
their disability, or alternatively, because United regarded them as dis-
abled.82 Petitioners claimed to be qualified applicants with a disability
under the ADA because their uncorrected vision substantially limited
their major life activity of seeing. 3 Additionally, Petitioners claimed
United regarded them as substantially limited in the major life activity of
working because United's policy has "no rational job-related basis," and
effectively removes them from consideration for global airline pilot po-
75. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 902 (10th Cir. 1997), aftd, 119 S.
Ct. 2139 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872, 879-80 (D. Kan. 1996),
affd, 141 F.3d 1185 (1Oth Cir. 1998), aftd, 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999).
76. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(1) (1999) (emphasis added).
77. See id. "If an employer reassigns the individual to less strenuous work because of
unsubstantiated fears that the individual will suffer a heart attack if he or she continues to perform
strenuous work, the employer would be regarding the individual as disabled." Id.
78. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2143 (1999).
79. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2143.
80. Petitioners are twin sisters, both having fulfilled the Federal Aviation Administration's
requirements necessary to fly all classes of passenger planes. See Brief for Petitioner at 3, Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999) (No. 97-1943). At the time of the interview,
Petitioners were experienced pilots with regional commuter airlines. See id.
81. Neither Petitioners' uncorrected vision was better than 20/200. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at
2143.
82. See id. Petitioners alleged the actual existence of a disability under 42 U.S.C. §
12102(2)(A). Petitioners alternatively alleged that they were regarded as being disabled under 42
U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C). See id.
83. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F. 3d 893, 895 (10th Cir. 1997)
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sitions. 4 The district court found that with corrective measures, Petition-
ers were "able to function identically to individuals without a similar
impairment."8 The district court thus granted United's motion to dismiss,
ruling that the Petitioners did not fall within the statutory meaning of
"disabled," because they were neither actually, nor regarded as, substan-
tially limited in a major life activity. 6
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the dis-
trict court decision,87 and reasoned that when corrective and mitigating
measures are considered, Petitioners are not substantially limited in the
major life activity of seeing. Further, the Tenth Circuit found that United
did not regard Petitioners as substantially limited in the major life activ-
ity of working.88 The Supreme Court of the United States granted certio-
rari 9 and affirmed the decision of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.9"
I. Supreme Court Opinion
1. Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court majority, in deciding whether courts should
consider a plaintiff's use of corrective or mitigating measures, focused
on the plain meaning of three separate provisions of the ADA.9 Petition-
ers argued that because the ADA does not address the issue of mitigating
measures, the Court should defer to the regulatory guidance, which pro-
vides that courts should evaluate an individual's impairment without
reference to mitigating measures. 2 The Court, however, sided with
United's arguments that the agency interpretations conflict with the plain
meaning of the ADA and the ADA's intent that the determination of dis-
ability is made on an individualized basis.93 Because it concluded that
reference to the ADA itself resolved the issue, the Court did not consider
84. See Sutton, 130 F.3d at 895.
85. Id. at 896 (quoting Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 96-S-121, 1996 WL 588917, at *3
(D. Colo. Aug. 28, 1996)).
86. Id. (citing Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 96-S-121, 1996 WL 588917, at *6 (D. Colo.
Aug. 28, 1996)).
87. See Sutton, 130 F.3d at 906. On appeal, Petitioners asserted that "they alleged sufficient
facts to establish that: (1) they were qualified applicants with a disability because they are
substantially limited in the major life activity of seeing, and (2) United regarded them as having a
substantially limiting impairment [in the major life activity of working]." Id. at 896.
88. See id. at 906.
89. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 790 (1999).
90. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2152. Justice O'Connor delivered the majority opinion in which
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg joined. See id.
Justice Ginsburg filed a concurring opinion. See id. at 2152. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting
opinion, in which Justice Breyer joined. See id. Justice Breyer also filed a separate dissenting
opinion. See id. at 2161.
91. See id. at 2146.
92. See id. See also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.20) (1999).
93. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146.
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the Act's legislative history, nor decide what deference is due the agency
interpretations.9
The Court first examined the statutory definition of "disability. 95
The Court concluded that because the phrase "substantially limits" is in
the present indicative verb form, the Act mandates that a major life ac-
tivity be "presently-not potentially or hypothetically" substantially lim-
ited.96 In other words, although an individual with poor eyesight is physi-
cally impaired, once that impairment is corrected, it does not substan-
tially limit a major life activity and a court should not be forced to
speculate as to the potential extent of limitations in the absence of such
utilized measures.97
Second, the Court recognized that the ADA's phrase "with respect
to an individual" commands an individualized inquiry as to whether a
plaintiff is disabled under the Act. Reference to an individual's uncor-
rected or unmitigated state is in diametrical opposition with this mandate
because, according to the Court, it would often "force [courts and em-
ployers] to make the disability determination based on general informa-
tion about how an uncorrected impairment usually affects individuals,
rather than on the individual's actual condition."99 This would produce
outcomes based on group generalizations rather than individual consid-
erations.'"
Finally, the Court found the legislative finding, published in the
"[flindings and purpose" section of the Act,'' that approximately forty-
three million Americans are disabled to be conclusive evidence that
Congress did not intend to bring people with correctable impairments,
such as the Petitioners, within the purview of the ADA." The Court rea-
soned that the cited number would be substantially larger if it included,
among others, the 100 million Americans with vision impairments, the
twenty-eight million hearing impaired, and the fifty million with high
blood pressure-all conditions for which corrective or mitigating meas-
ures are largely available.' 3 Based on this, the Court concluded that had
94. See id.
95. Id. at 2146-47.
96. Id.
97. See id.
98. Id. at 2147.
99. Id.
100. See id. The Majority further noted that disregard of an individual's utilization of mitigating
or corrective measures would preclude courts and employers from considering any negative side
effects caused by such measures and contributing to a claimed limitation. See id.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994).
102. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147.
103. See id. at 2148-49. The Court noted that the source of the 43 million figure is uncertain,
but that in earlier proposed legislation, Congress relied on a 1986 report by the National Council on
Disability which estimated the number of disabled Americans to be approximately 36 million. See
id. at 2147. When it passed the ADA in 1990, it is likely that Congress relied, in part, on an updated
version of this report, which estimated the number to be 37.3 million. See id. at 2148. This updated
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Congress intended to include individuals with corrected physical im-
pairments, it would have included them in the figure cited in the congres-
sional findings."'
Considering these three sections' 5 of the Act together, the Court
concluded that the ADA requires that mitigating measures be considered
in making the disability determination." Thus, the Petitioners could not,
"in fact," be considered substantially limited in their ability to see under
the first prong of the definition.' °7
The Court next considered the petitioner's alternative allegation
that, even if not actually disabled under the first prong of the definition,
United "regarded" them as disabled because it erroneously assumed that
Petitioners' impairment substantially limits them in the major life activ-
ity of working.' 0 This assumption constitutes a disability under the third
prong of the ADA's definition.'"
The Court first noted that the ADA allows employers to establish
physical criteria for its various positions of employment." An employer
"is free to decide that some limiting, but not substantially limiting, im-
pairments make individuals less than ideally suited for a job.""' The
Court adopted the reasoning of the EEOC on this issue and determined
that to be substantially limited in the major life activity of working, an
employer's erroneous assumption must effectively preclude the plaintiff
report, issued in 1988, and others cited by the Majority used a "functional approach" in determining
the number of disabled Americans. Id. A functional approach measures the limitations of people in
performing basic activities such as seeing, hearing, walking, lifting, speaking, etc. See id. Under a
functional approach, if a person usually employs the use of corrective or mitigating measures to
lessen the effect of one's impairment, that person's limitation is measured with the use of such
measures. See id. A "health conditions approach," on the other hand, measures the impairment's
effect on the individual without regard to any corrective or mitigating measures. Id. In other words,
this approach "looks at all conditions that impair the health or normal functional abilities of an
individual." Id. Consequently, the latter approach produces a much higher number than the former
because it includes, for example: people with poor eyesight (although they may wear glasses or
contacts), people with poor hearing (although they may employ the use of a hearing aid), and people
with high blood pressure (although they may take medicine to control it).
104. See id. at 2149.
105. (1) The definition, (2) the individualized basis mandate, and (3) the legislative findings.
106. See id. at 2146. In addressing concerns of Justice Steven's dissent, the Court elaborated on
its holding stating that "[t]he use or nonuse of a corrective device does not determine whether an
individual is disabled; that determination depends on whether the limitations an individual with an
impairment actually faces are in fact substantially limiting." Id. at 2149 (emphasis added).
107. Id. at 2149.
108. Id. at 2150. Interestingly, the Court noted that Petitioners did not "make the obvious
argument" that United regarded them as substantially limited in the major life activity of seeing. Id.
The major life activity of working, in effect, requires plaintiffs to meet a higher standard. See supra
notes 49-50 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the EEOC discourages consideration of
"working" as a major life activity, except as a last resort; i.e., unless no other major life activity is
substantially limited. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(j).
109. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
110. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2150.
111. Id. (emphasis added).
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from "either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes."' 2
Elaborating, the Court stated, "one must be precluded from more than
one type of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of choice."'" The
Court found the position of a global airline pilot to be a "single job," and
that United's barring of Petitioners from that position did not support a
finding that United regarded the two sisters as substantially limited in
their ability to work because of their impairment."4 The Supreme Court
affirmed the Tenth Circuit conclusion that the Petitioners had not stated a
claim that they were actually, or were regarded as being, substantially
limited in a major life activity."5
2. Justice Ginsburg's Concurrence
Justice Ginsburg agreed with the Court that the legislative findings
are evidence of Congress's intention that the ADA's coverage be limited
to a "historically disadvantaged" class. '6 The Justice added that the large
number of Americans with corrected impairments could hardly be con-
sidered part of a "discrete and insular minority," as Congress described
the position of disabled Americans."' Nor have they been "subjected to a
history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of
political powerlessness in our society."'8
3. Justice Steven's Dissent
Justice Stevens acknowledged that Congress likely did not intend
that every person who wears glasses be protected by the ADA." 9 He as-
serted, however, that the Court should generously construe the ADA to
give effect to its remedial nature.'2 1 Justice Stevens charged that it is a
canon of statutory construction that courts give remedial legislation a
broad construction to allow remedies in comparable situations under the
112. Id. at 2151 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)). Although it noted a "conceptual
difficulty" with the inclusion of "working- in the definition of "major life activity," the Court
deferred to the EEOC because the parties did not dispute the validity of its inclusion. Id.
113. Id. Ironically, a significant illustration noted by the Court was provided by the EEOC's
Interpretive Guidance stating that "an individual who cannot be a commercial airline pilot because of
a minor vision impairment, but who can be a commercial airline co-pilot or a pilot for a courier
service, would not be substantially limited in the major life activity of working." Id. (citing 29
C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2).
114. Id. The Court also addressed Petitioners' argument that if the vision requirement were
adopted by all airlines, Petitioners would be substantially limited in their ability to work. See id. at
2152. The Court declared that simply imputing a valid job requirement to all other employers does
not invalidate the requirement. See id.
115. See id.
116. Id. at 2152 (Ginsburg, J., concurring (relying on the language of 42 U.S.C. §
12101(a)(7))).
117. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7)).
118. Id.
119. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
120. See id.
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legislation.'2 He argued that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a
clear example of this canon, as its initial and intended focus on protect-
ing African-Americans from discrimination in employment opportunities
has been enlarged to prohibit other forms of discrimination, and dis-
crimination against other classes.'22
Justice Stevens also questioned the Majority's analysis of the sub-
parts of the definition as mutually exclusive categories.' 23 He argued that
courts should consider the three prongs of the definition together to de-
termine whether a claimant is, or once was, substantially limited in a
major life activity and that, therefore, courts should not refer to amelio-
rative measures, presumably because it does not change the fact that the
individual was impaired at some point. 24 Justice Stevens determined that
the legislative history and agency guidance support this interpretation.'25
Justice Stevens further disputed the Court's contention that the EEOC
approach creates a system in which courts assess individuals with refer-
ence to groups with similar impairments.' 6 He pointed out that "[i]t is just
as easy individually to test Petitioners' eyesight with their glasses on as
with their glasses off."'27 Moreover, the Justice contended that the Court's
approach condoned group stereotypes by allowing employers to discrimi-
nate against individuals who control their impairments by some means. 2
4. Justice Breyer's Dissent
Justice Breyer wrote in dissent to note his broad interpretation of the
definition of "disability," a reading that Breyer argued would ensure that
none of Congress's intended beneficiaries be excluded from ADA cover-
age.29 He explained that should this interpretation result in an unaccept-
able number of baseless lawsuits, the EEOC could issue more explicit
definitional regulations excluding classes whom Congress did not intend
to be within the protections of the ADA.'30
121. Seeid.at2157.
122. See id. (noting that Hispanic-Americans, Asian-Americans, and as early as 1976,
Caucasians have been included under the protection of Title VII, and that recently same-sex sexual
harassment was ruled to be conduct prohibited by Title VII).
123. See id. at 2153.
124. See id. at 2153-54. (observing that subsection (3) of the disability definition "include[s] in
the protected class those who were once disabled but who are now fully recovered").
125. See id. at 2154-56 (citing S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt.
3, at 28 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 451; H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334; and 29 C.F.R., pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(j) (1999)).
126. See id. at 2159.
127. Id.
128. See id. (explaining that "the Court's approach would seem to allow an employer to refuse
to hire every person who has epilepsy or diabetes that is controlled by medication, or every person
who functions efficiently with a prosthetic limb").
129. Seeid.at2161.
130. See id. at 2161-62.
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III. ANALYSIS
Many commentators perceive the Supreme Court's decision as a
victory for employers and as a major setback for the rights of disabled
Americans.' While the decision will likely decrease the number of un-
meritorious claims and the resulting cost to employers, it is doubtful that
it will adversely affect the rights of people who experience employment
discrimination based on an actual or perceived disability.'32 The Supreme
Court's decision merely clarifies the definition of "disability," and im-
bues the determination of disability with a necessary dose of reality.
After Sutton, a disability produced by a substantially limiting im-
pairment still falls within the first prong of the definition. It is recog-
nized, however, that fully corrected impairments are not disabling but for
the misinformed, mistaken, or unjustly biased beliefs of others."' In other
words, a fully corrected impairment is only disabling if an employer re-
gards it as such. Indeed, how else could a fully corrected impairment
substantially limit a person?
A court properly classifies a mitigated impairment under either the
second or the third prong depending on the facts of the case. If the
treated impairment still results in an actual and substantial limitation, it is
a disability under the first prong of the definition. If an impairment no
longer substantially limits an individual, but a record of such limitation
exists, and an employer has discriminated against the individual based on
a perceived limitation resulting from the corrected impairment, then a
claim exists under the second prong. Similarly, if an existing, but treated,
impairment does not result in an actual and substantial limitation, it is
still a disability under the third prong if an employer bases an adverse
employment action on the perception that the impairment does constitute
a substantial limitation.' If no adverse employment action has occurred
based on the perceived disability, then no cause of action exists.
Arguments that favor disregarding mitigating measures are often
based on the contention that the Court's interpretation fails to give effect
to congressional intent and the regulatory guidance based on that ex-
pressed intent. As previously discussed, however, the legislative history
is ambiguous at best. "5 Moreover, the agency guidance, which is argua-
131. See Robert S. Greenberger, Supreme Court Narrows Scope of Disability Act, WALL ST. J.,
June 23, 1999, at B 1; Marcia Coyle, ADA: Clarified or Ruined? Disabled Community is Dismayed;
Business Gives a Sigh of Relief, NAT'L L.J., July 5, 1999, at AI (quoting Professor Chai Feldblum
stating "[i]t's as devastating a cut to the ADA as one could imagine"); Joan Biskupic, Supreme
Court Limits Meaning of Disability, WASH. POST, June 23, 1999, at Al (quoting attorney Michael A.
Green stating "[y]ou're damned if you don't medicate, but you're damned if you do, because you
lose your legal rights").
132. See, e.g., infra note 205 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
134. See infra note 202 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
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bly based on misinterpreted congressional intent, is not binding on
courts.
13 6
I. Congressional Intent and a Reasonable Reading of the Definition of
"Disability"
Although Senate and House committee reports expressly state that
the disability determination be made without reference to the availability
of mitigating measures, this apparent mandate must be reviewed in the
context in which it is made and with regard to Congress's clearly ex-
pressed purpose in enacting the ADA. For instance, Congress follows or
precedes these express statements with examples of diabetics, epileptics,
or people using prosthetic devices.' 7 It is arguable that these were the
situations Congress contemplated when making this declaration, and not
situations where an impairment is completely, or almost completely,
corrected with treatment or other means.
3 8
This becomes more obvious as the committee reports describe the
purpose of the third prong of the disability definition as ensuring "that
persons with medical conditions that are under control, and that there-
fore do not currently limit major life activities, are not discriminated
against on the basis of their medical conditions.""' This language sug-
gests that Congress intended that those whose impairments are con-
trolled, and are therefore not limited in any significant way by such im-
pairments, be protected under the third prong.'" Congress seemingly also
intended that those with substantial limitations that are, however, miti-
gated to a certain extent, still be protected under the first prong if they
remain substantially limited by the impairment notwithstanding the
treatment."' The Court's holding effectuates this intent. Justice Stevens
136. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
137. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334.
See also S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989) (identical quote); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28-29
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 451 ("The impairment should be assessed without
considering whether mitigating measures ... would result in a less-than-substantial limitation.").
138. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990), stating:
Whether a person has a disability should be assessed without regard to the
availability of mitigating measures, such as reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids.
For example, a person who is hard of hearing is substantially limited in the major life
activity of hearing, even though the loss may be corrected through the use of a hearing
aid. Likewise, persons with impairments, such as epilepsy or diabetes, which
substantially limit a major life activity are covered under the first prong of the definition
of disability, even if the effects of the impairment are controlled by medication.
Id. (emphasis added).
It is arguable from this language that Congress intended that impairments that "may be
corrected" by available remedies, but that are not corrected for whatever reason, shall still be
considered disabilities if substantially limiting. Likewise, it is plausible that Congress intended
courts to consider impairments that "are controlled," but which are still substantially limiting
disabilities.
139. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 24.
140. See Bridges, supra note 71, at 1077-78.
141. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52; S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23(1989).
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argued that the Court's holding precludes people with disabilities that are
treatable to any extent (such as epileptics, those utilizing a prosthetic
device, or those suffering from hypertension) from obtaining the ADA's
protection."2 Clarifying its holding, however, and addressing the con-
cerns of the dissenting opinions, the Court stated the following:
The dissents suggest that viewing individuals in their corrected state
will exclude from the definition of 'disab[led]' those who use pros-
thetic limbs, or take medicine for epilepsy or high blood pressure.
This suggestion is incorrect. The use of a corrective device does not,
by itself, relieve one's disability. Rather, one has a disability under
[the first prong of the definition] if, notwithstanding the use of a cor-
rective device, that individual is substantially limited in a major life
activity. For example, individuals who use prosthetic limbs or wheel-
chairs may be mobile and capable of functioning in society but still
be disabled because of a substantial limitation on their ability to walk
or run .... Alternatively, one whose high blood pressure is 'cured'
by medication may be regarded as disabled by a covered entity, and
thus disabled under [the third prong of the definition]. The use or
nonuse of a corrective device does not determine whether an individ-
ual is disabled; that determination depends on whether the limita-
tions an individual with an impairment actually faces are in fact sub-
stantially limiting. 1
43
Furthermore, Congress's ideological foundation for the ADA also
does not support the over-expansive interpretation urged by the dissent-
ers. The Court undertook a lengthy analysis of the meaning behind the
number of disabled Americans cited by Congress in the "[flindings and
purpose" section of the ADA." Although there are inherent difficulties
in obtaining an accurate estimate of the number of people with disabili-
ties in America, 4 the forty-three million figure is generally regarded as a
"useful, rough estimate."'"M Justice Stevens cited National Organization
for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler,17 for the proposition that "a 'statement of
congressional findings is a rather thin reed upon which to base' a statu-
tory construction.' '4 ' The full quote from Scheidler, however, reads: "We
also think that the quoted statement of congressional findings is a rather
thin reed upon which to base a . . .motive neither expressed nor, we
think, fairly implied in the operative sections of the Act."'49 The Court in
Scheidler referred to a specific quote; not congressional findings in gen-
eral. In fact, the Supreme Court, in Dole v. United Steelworkers of
142. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
143.' Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2149 (1999) (internal cross-references
omitted) (emphasis added).
144. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147-49.
145. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
147. 510 U.S. 249 (1994).
148. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2160.
149. Scheidler, 510 U.S. at 260 (1994) (emphasis added).
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America,'5 ° noted that when a court is attempting to interpret or clarify a
statutory phrase, "[p]articularly useful is the provision detailing Con-
gress' purposes in enacting the statute.""'
It is clear when one considers the language used in the legislative
"[flindings and purpose" section that Congress had a particular, although
difficult to define, class of eligible individuals in mind for coverage un-
der the ADA. Congress described individuals "isolate[d] and segre-
gate[d]" by society.'52 Congress further described the intended benefici-
aries of the ADA as "a discrete and insular minority who have been
faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purpose-
ful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerless-
ness in our society."5 3 These congressional findings echo from a stream
of testimonials delivered by disabled people before Congress.' Con-
spicuously absent from the congressional record is testimony from indi-
viduals with fully treated hypertension, or wholly corrected myopia. No
such individuals were present before Congress to relate their experience
of "purposeful unequal treatment," or their consequent "isolat[ion] and
segregat[ion]" from society.
Aside from not being the object of animus-based discrimination,
Professor Harris makes the point that the insurance justification'5 for the
ADA does not explain why people with controlled impairments should
have ADA protection.' 6 As explained, this justification is based on the
rationale that if disabled people are accommodated, they will stay em-
ployed, and collect less in disability benefits.' As for people with cor-
rected impairments:
[tihese individuals would not be unemployed without the ADA. They
do not face any barriers (physical or intangible) to equal opportunity
in the workplace. Their impairments do not impede them because
their impairments are controlled. Because they suffer no substantial
limitation on any major life activity, individuals with controlled im-
150. 494 U.S. 26 (1990).
151. Id. at 36.
152. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (1994).
153. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7).
154. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 101-485(H) (statement of Judith Heumann, at 29-30, 42) (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 311, 324; id. (statement of Marchell Hunt, at 38), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 320; id. (statement of Gregory Hilbok, at 39), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 321; id. (statement of Charles Crawford, at 41), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 323; id. (statement of Emeka Nwojke, at 41), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 323; id.
(statement of Virginia Domini, at 42), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 324; id. (statement of
Sandy Parino, at 43), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 325.
155. See text accompanying notes 23-24.
156. See Harris, supra note 23, at 596.
157. See text accompanying notes 23-24.
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pairments are not precluded from full and equal opportunity in em-
ployment.'
Thus, people with fully corrected impairments cannot rationally be
included in the first prong of the definition. People with mitigated im-
pairments, on the other hand, may be included in the first prong depend-
ing on the extent of their limitation. Further, people with either corrected
or mitigated impairments may be included under the third prong of the
definition, and thus afforded ADA protection, if they have experienced
discrimination due to any such impairment (either real, imagined, cor-
rected, mitigated, or otherwise).
Sections of Justice Stevens' dissent demonstrate a particular misun-
derstanding of the mechanics of the statutory definition. For example, in
describing the plight of a man with a prosthetic limb and arguing that
such an individual, under the majority opinion, will have no recourse
under the ADA, Justice Stevens wrote "[i]n my view, when an employer
refuses to hire the individual 'because of his prosthesis, and the prosthe-
sis in no way affects his ability to do the job, that employer has unques-
tionably discriminated against the individual in violation of the Act."'59
This is a blinding glimpse of the obvious considering the legislative his-
tory, and the EEOC's regulations and guidance describing the third
prong of the definition, notwithstanding the fact that courts may still con-
sider such an individual disabled under the first prong if the disabled
person's life activities are still substantially limited. The employer has
"unquestionably" discriminated against the individual based on a dis-
ability because such individual can perform the essential functions of the
job with or without reasonable accommodation ("the prosthesis in no
way affects his ability to do the job"). However, the individual is dis-
abled under the third prong of the definition because the employer "re-
garded" him as disabled. The employer's fear and/or stereotyping disable
the individual, not the actual impairment, at least as it relates to the es-
sential functions of the job. If the prosthesis "in no way affects his abil-
ity," then he is not substantially limited under the first prong of the defi-
nition. Justice Stevens omitted any discussion of the third prong of the
disability definition.'" His dissent leaves unacknowledged the fact that an
entire section of the statutory definition is devoted to people whose im-
pairments do not substantially limit them but who are treated as such and
are thus limited because of the denial of opportunity.'6'
Justice Stevens next contended that, under the majority's interpreta-
tion, no reason would exist for the second prong of the definition.'62 In
attempting to demonstrate this, however, the Justice examined language
158. Harris, supra note 23, at 596.
159. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2154 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
160. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2152-61.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 2153-54; supra note 37.
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from the majority's opinion, but taken out of context. The dissent reads,
"[i]f the Court is correct that '[a] disability exists only where' a person's
'present' or 'actual' condition is substantially impaired, there would be
no reason to include in the protected class those who were once disabled
but who are now fully recovered."'63 First, courts are not to examine
whether one's "condition is substantially impaired"; they are to examine
whether a major life activity is substantially impaired.'" Justice Stevens
seemed to focus on the impairment instead of the effect of the impair-
ment on the individual's life.'65 Moreover, the second prong of the defi-
nition is "included in the definition in part to protect individuals who
have recovered from a physical or mental impairment which previously
substantially limited them in a major life activity.'"" The actual "disabil-
ity" essentially arises as a result of people's fears, perhaps of recurrence
for example, that effectively preclude the individual from engaging in a
major life activity. In other words, the individual's past disability is pres-
ently disabling, not because of the impairment (which has since been
cured, treated, or has otherwise disappeared), but because of other peo-
ple's attitudes regarding the past disability. The distinction between the
impairment and the effect of the impairment is a crucial one in under-
standing the mechanics of the ADA's definition of disability.
Justice Stevens further asserted that:
[t]he three prongs of the statute ... are most plausibly read together
not to inquire into whether a person is currently 'functionally' limited
in a major life activity, but only into the existence of an impair-
ment-present or past-that substantially limits, or did so limit, the
individual before amelioration. This reading avoids the counterintui-
tive conclusion that the ADA's safeguards vanish when individuals
make themselves more employable by ascertaining ways to overcome
their physical or mental limitations.
67
The EEOC language, however, points to the independence of each part
of the definition. The interpretive guidance, upon which Justice Stevens
relied, describes how the definition is "divided" into three parts, how an
163. Id. at 2154 (internal reference omitted). The portion of the majority opinion from which
Justice Stevens derives the phrase "a disability exists only where" reads in full as "[a] 'disability'
exists only where an impairment 'substantially limits' a major life activity, not 'might,' 'could,' or
'would' be substantially limiting if mitigating measures were not taken." Id. at 2146.
164. See quoted material supra note 163.
165. The EEOC has acknowledged the importance of making the disability determination based
on the effect of the impairment. 29 C.F.R. part 1630, app. § 1630.2(j) (1999). "The determination of
whether an individual has a disability is not necessarily based on the name or diagnosis of the
impairment the person has, but rather on the effect of that impairment on the life of the individual."
Id. 166. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334
(emphasis added). See also S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989). Congress also intended this prong of
the definition to protect people misclassified as disabled. See id.
167. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2154.
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individual must "satisfy at least one of these parts" and that an individual
is considered disabled "if that individual either [falls into category (1),
(2)], 'or,' (3) . ,,8 This language is not indicative of mutually depend-
ent subsections. Justice Stevens' conclusion that the ADA's safeguards
will vanish for some individuals under a conventional reading of the
definition is based on his flawed understanding of the separate defini-
tional prongs themselves. 9
II. The EEOC Interpretation - Deference Due and Practical Effects
Notwithstanding the problematic language expressing congressional
intent on the mitigating measures issue, the EEOC adopted the position
that courts should disregard the effect of mitigating or corrective meas-
ures on the impairment. The EEOC, perhaps recognizing the ambiguous
congressional intent, appended this position to the regulations instead of
including it within its provisions. Such a position, relegated to the ap-
pendix, is decidedly not binding on courts.'70 Moreover, the guidance
provided by the EEOC contains many of the same internal inconsisten-
cies as the congressional record. 7' Even if the EEOC had included its
interpretation in the regulations, a court could decline to follow it if the
court found its' mandates contradictory to the statute.'72
The ADA distinctly describes its protected class in its "[f]indings
and purpose" section and presents the definition of disability in such a
way as to preclude those with controlled impairments unless their dis-
ability results from the irrational perceptions of another."3 Furthermore,
the ADA clearly mandates an individualized determination of disability
based on the reality of the plaintiffs circumstances. 4 The Supreme
Court's interpretation on the mitigating measures issue is reasonable in
light of this mandate and the ambiguously expressed congressional in-
tent. The EEOC, on this point, seems to have ignored the statutory man-
date. As stated by the Supreme Court, an alternative interpretation vio-
lates the plain meaning of the ADA."' Not to mention that such an ex-
pansive interpretation is simply unreasonable when its practical effects
are considered.'76
168. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(g) (emphasis added).
169. See supra notes 159-166.
170. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
171. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
172. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
173. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (1994).
174. See42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
175. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2147 (1999).
176. Justice Stevens alluded to many employers' fear that the EEOC's interpretation might
encourage a "flood of litigation." Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2159 (1999).
Justice Stevens presented a narrow argument as to why he believes that the EEOC interpretation
should not create such anxiety. See id. at 2158--60. However, it appears obvious that tripling or
quadrupling the size of any protected class will result in increased litigation.
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Indeed, many problems with the EEOC interpretation involve its
practical effects. One illustration is the protection it would afford at-will
employees against termination. 77 Employers would be forced to absorb
additional (real or threatened) costs to fire an employee who claims the
termination is based on discrimination. '7 Most employer-employee rela-
tionships continue on an at-will basis."9 When confronted with a dis-
crimination claim, however, an employer must rebut the claim with evi-
dence of one or more legitimate, justifiable reasons for the termination.'80
Professor Harris describes a typical situation:
Suppose an employee senses he is about to be fired. If the employee
notifies the employer that he is protected under the ADA, he forces
the employer to accumulate a documented record supporting a just
cause dismissal before the employer can take action against him.
When creating a record for just cause termination is too difficult,
costly, or time consuming, an employer may abandon or delay a deci-
sion to discharge the employee. Thus, the power to claim protection
amounts to extra protection from adverse employment action.'
The increased likelihood that an unmeritorious claim will survive sum-
mary judgment increases the value of "nuisance suits" to claimants.'82
The EEOC interpretation drastically expanded the class of people af-
forded ADA protection and thus, increased the cost to employers ex-
posed to frivolous claims and nuisance suits.' 3
Justice Stevens argued in his dissent that courts should broadly con-
strue remedial legislation to encompass similar situations." He illus-
trated his point by showing that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
has evolved from protecting only African-Americans to protecting sev-
eral races and varying forms of discrimination.'85 The difference, how-
ever, is that the protected classes of the Civil Rights Act are not subject
to manipulation; that is, you either are or are not African-American.'86
The protected class under the ADA, however, is naturally amorphous and
thus ambiguously defined. This makes the ADA unlike other anti-
discrimination legislation and therefore encourages manipulation of the






183. See id. at 581-94 (presenting clear reasoning as to exactly how and why a plaintiffs
chances of surviving summary judgment increase under the EEOC interpretation).
184. See supra notes 119-122 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
186. See Harris, supra note 23, at 586 (describing the unique nature of the ADA's protected
class).
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definition/protected class. '87 Application of the EEOC interpretation ex-
acerbated this situation.
Congress designed the ADA to operate based on reality as opposed
to requiring courts and employers to speculate on the effects of hypo-
thetically untreated impairments. The ADA's mandate to consider dis-
abilities on a case-by-case basis and the EEOC's express endorsement of
this mandate provide evidence of this operative basis.'88 Employers lack
the necessary expertise to speculate on how untreated impairments would
hypothetically affect an employee.'89 Courts that disregard mitigating
measures likewise indulge in fantasy when considering the hypothetical
state of impairment of an individual who consistently utilizes mitigating
measures to control such impairment.'" By holding that the determina-
tion of whether an individual is disabled includes consideration of any
mitigating or corrective measures, the Supreme Court removed the
analysis from the hypothetical to the veritable as mandated by the plain
language of the ADA.
IlL. Proper Classification of a Claim Within the Disability Definition
The statutory definition of disability.is already necessarily broad so
as not to preclude those who require protection. Congress did not attempt
to actually list impairments that qualify as disabilities at the risk of
overlooking impairments and therefore excluding certain individuals.' 9'
The Supreme Court, however, effectively suggested that a line was
drawn by Congress's statement of findings. "A statute that protects eve-
ryone protects no one."'1
92
Some authorities, including the United States Commission on Civil
Rights, have argued that the concepts of disabilities ... are largely
socially determined and that virtually everyone is 'handicapped' for
one purpose or another.
187. See id.
188. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (1999); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. §
1630.2(g), (j).
189. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Society for Human Resource Management in Support of
Respondents at 1-2, Sutton (No. 97-1943).
190. For example, after the Sutton decision, in EEOC v. R.J. Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d 645 (5th
Cir. 1999), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in considering whether a form of blood cancer was a
disability, noted that "[w]ithout treatment, [plaintiff's] condition would have resulted in 'severe
anemia, systemic infection, internal bleeding' and would 'infiltrate other organs or body systems."'
EEOC, 181 F.3d at 653 (emphasis added). Thus, before Sutton, the court might have "assume[d] that
[plaintiff] was suffering from [these afflictions]," when, in fact, the plaintiff was treated and
experienced none of these limiting afflictions. Id. at 653-54.
191. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989) "It is not possible to include in the legislation
a list of all the specific conditions, diseases, or infections that would constitute physical or mental
impairments because of the difficulty of ensuring the comprehensiveness of such a list..." See id.
192. Brief of Amicus Curiae Society for Human Resource Management in Support of
Respondents at 7, Sutton (No. 97-1943).
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Nevertheless, federal laws have generally assumed that a distinct
class of disabilities or handicapping conditions exists, and have tar-
geted individuals with such conditions as the principal beneficiaries
of federal services, benefits, and protection.'9
The ADA targets that distinct class by limiting coverage to those
whose impairments (or other's attitudes) substantially limit them in per-
forming major life activities. Millions of Americans have various ail-
ments and impairments that prevent them from certain activities. How-
ever, these afflictions are often trivial, temporary, or mitigated by various
therapies or remedies. In short, they do not impede an individual beyond
what a reasonable person might consider "normal." People with disabili-
ties, however, often face daily obstacles in the performance of the most
elementary and fundamental of activities.'94 The Tenth Circuit implied
that Petitioners' claim that they actually are disabled trivializes the con-
dition of being "disabled."'95 However, a claim that an employer re-
garded a person as disabled, even if such person is not actually disabled,
does not trivialize the condition of being disabled, but recognizes the
existence of society's discriminatory stereotypes.
That United "regarded" the Petitioners as being disabled was cer-
tainly the Petitioners' most cogent argument. It represents exactly what
Congress envisioned when considering the third prong of the definition.
The attitudes and unfounded assumptions about disabled people have
contributed significantly to their subordination in society.'96 Here, Peti-
tioners claimed that United regarded them as disabled in the major life
activity of working because "United presumed without substantiation that
they [could not] perform the function of the job [and that] United disquali-
fied them based on 'myth, fear or stereotype' that individuals with uncor-
rected vision of worse than 20/100 constitute a safety hazard."'97
The Supreme Court did not require United to substantiate its reasons
for having such a requirement, but focused on petitioner's claim that
United regarded the plaintiffs as disabled in the major life activity of
working.' 8 The Court seemed to suggest that Petitioners might have met
with more success had they claimed that United regarded them as sub-
stantially limited in the major life activity of seeing.'' This claim might
have resulted in the Court requiring United to substantiate the need for its
vision requirement. After all, it is certainly not beyond the realm of pos-
sibilities that United's vision requirement is a completely arbitrary re-
193. Burgdorf, supra note 10, at 441.
194. See, e.g., supra note 154 and accompanying text.
195. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 898 (10th Cir. 1997) (commenting that "the
impairment must be significant, and not merely trivial").
196. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
197. Sutton, 130 F.3d at 903.
198. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2149-52 (1999).
199. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2150. See also supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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quirement with no basis in necessity, safety, or otherwise. However, the
issue did not arise because Petitioners did not claim that United incor-
rectly regarded them as unable to see. Instead, the Court considered
whether United improperly concluded that Petitioners were unable to
work in a "class" or "broad range of jobs."2' The Court concluded that
United had not.2"'
This may be an overly stringent test for a plaintiff to meet when
trying to prove that an employer regarded her as substantially limited in
the major life activity of working."2 It essentially presents a Catch-22
situation to a plaintiff claiming a disability under the first prong because
if she succeeds at showing that her impairment substantially limits her in
performing a class of jobs, she has in effect argued that she is not a
"qualified individual with a disability" because she cannot perform the
essential functions of the job, and she would therefore not qualify for
protection under the ADA.203 This is a significant hurdle for a plaintiff
claiming an actual disability under the first prong of the definition. Thus
in pleading, such plaintiffs should attempt to identify a major life activity
that is substantially limited other than working when claiming a first
prong disability. On the other hand, when a plaintiff claims that a em-
ployer incorrectly believes that an employee or applicant cannot perform
a job-because of a mistaken belief based on a past record of disability
(second prong), or a misperception related to a disability (third prong)-
the hurdle presented by the "qualified individual" analysis is
significantly lower assuming the plaintiff can actually prove that the
employer's belief is incorrect. This is proven simply by showing that the
plaintiff can perform the essential functions of the job.
It is arguably evident from the above analysis however, that Congress
intended people with largely mitigated or corrected impairments to have
ADA protection from the discriminatory misperceptions of employers
under the second and third prongs and not to claim an actual disability
200. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2151. Although an individual may be limited in his or her ability to
perform a certain job, it is not until this limitation rises to the level of substantial that the ADA
deems it a disability. Preclusion from a class of jobs is simply evidence of a substantial limitation,
whereas courts do not consider preclusion from a single job a substantial limitation. See supra text
accompanying notes 49-50. The EEOC regulations recommend that courts give this evidence great
weight in determining whether one is substantially limited in the major life activity of working. See
C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B)-(C).
201. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2151.
202. Additional commentary on this suggestion is beyond the scope of this Comment. But see
Brief of Senators Harkin and Kennedy, Representatives Hoyer and Owens and Former Senator Dole
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent Kirkingburg and Petitioners Sutton and Murphy at 25-28,
(Nos. 97-1943, 97-1992, 98-591) (suggesting that "[t]he only way to give meaning to the 'regarded
as' prong is to interpret the rejection from the job in question to signify the employer's view of the
plaintiff's ability to perform the class of jobs to which the job in question belongs").
203. See supra note 30 and text accompanying note 33 (defining "qualified individual with a
disability," and describing how a plaintiff must, in reaching the "qualified individual" inquiry, must
first demonstrate that she is disabled under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)). See also supra note 202.
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under the first prong. Properly applied,2' Sutton will sustain the protec-
tion afforded by the ADA to America's disabled population, and, as in-
tended, still allow those without per se disabling impainnents to have
their day in court when an employer's discrimination is based on mis-
taken beliefs regarding an impairment. In fact, since Sutton, courts have
properly dismissed various plaintiffs claims of actual disability under
the first prong when their impairments were substantially mitigated or
corrected, but sustained their claims under the third prong when their
employers nevertheless discriminated against them. 5
IV. CONCLUSION
Left unanalyzed, Justice Stevens' misunderstanding of the intended
mechanics of the statutory definitions of "disability," his focus on the
"impairment" instead of the "disability," his misquotes, and his omission
of any discussion of the inconsistencies in the legislative history, all
combine to nourish a seed that may quickly grow to sprout the leaves of
discontent among an ill-informed public. Such discontent could plausibly
lead citizens to place calls to Congress members who, equally ill-
informed (most were either not present at the time the ADA was enacted,
or, if present, cannot be expected to recall every detail emanating from
events transpiring eleven years ago), might conceivably present a bill to
amend the ADA' s definition in favor of the EEOC interpretation."°
This need not be the case however. The Supreme Court's recent in-
terpretation of the ADA's definition of "disability" finally clarifies a
muddied area of disability law. It offers a reasonable and practical inter-
pretation of the ADA's definition of disability. When signing the ADA
into law, President Bush declared that "[tihe Americans with Disabilities
Act presents us all with an historic opportunity. It signals the end to the
unjustified segregation and exclusion of persons with disabilities from
the mainstream of American life."2 7 Sutton will return the ADA to those
204. See supra notes 200-203 and accompanying text (properly applied, and perhaps, with
reconsideration by the EEOC or the Court of the "class of jobs" requirement when the major life
activity claimed to be limited is that of working).
205., See, e.g., EEOC v. R.J. Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d 645 (5th Cir. 1999) (concluding that
although plaintiffs remitting cancer did not substantially limit his ability to work, a material factual
dispute existed regarding whether he had a record of disability or was regarded as having a
disability); Haiman v. Village of Fox Lake, 1999 WL 476973 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (holding that
plaintiffs heart condition did not significantly restrict her ability to work, but that she had presented
sufficient evidence to allow a finding that her employer regarded her as disabled).
206. See Greenberger, supra note 131, at B 1 (quoting Professor Chai Feldblum stating "I think
people with disabilities may well need to question whether we should ask Congress to revisit this
issue.").
207. Statement by President George Bush upon Signing S. 933, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 602
(July 26, 1990).
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who demanded and impelled its enactment, 8 and remove it from the
opportunist grasp of those who know nothing of the isolation and pow-
erlessness bred by disability.' While it is true that the definition of "dis-
ability" is largely intuitive, congressional testimony exposed its parame-
ters."' The result was an inevitably imperfect definition that is, neverthe-
less, workable due to its flexibility. However, courts and claimants
stretched that flexibility to a level that placed an absurd demand on em-
ployers..' and courts,"2 resulting in subordination of the Act's ideological
roots. The Supreme Court's ruling should contract the ADA's protected
class back to that which was reasonably contemplated by Congress by
excluding those whose trivial impairments present no practical or sub-
stantial limitation on their lives, and by including those who have miti-
gated or corrected impairments, yet are still regarded as disabled.
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208. See Harris, supra note 23, at 608 (arguing that "[a]s [the EEOC in controlled impairment
cases] continues to venture outward from the original model of anti-discrimination legislation to
extend protection to other groups, the dangers of losing sight of the ideological foundations of the
legislation increases").
209. See id. (arguing that the EEOC interpretation "gives an economic windfall to an
undeserving class").
210. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 177-183 and accompanying text.
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